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CITY OF WACO V. KELLEY:
THE TEN-YEAR SAGA OF THE
RIGHTS OF CIVIL SERVANTS
By: Jessica McCurry
ABSTRACT
Chapter 143 of the Texas Local Government Code, known as the "Fire
Fighterand Police Officer Civil Service Act," was passed to provide civil servants, valued government employees, with certain rights and protections. A
key right enumerated in The Act is a civil servant's right to elect to appeal a
disciplinary action. He may appeal the action to the local civil service commission or to an independent hearing examiner not affiliated with the municipality. In 2010, the Texas Supreme Court in City of Waco v. Kelley held that
independent hearing examiners are limited to certain actions when deciding
disciplinary appeals. The court held that if a hearing examinerfinds that the
charges againsta civil servant are true, he only has three courses of action. He
may (1) uphold an indefinite suspension from the department; (2) impose a
temporary suspension of fifteen days or less; or (3) completely restore the civil
servant's former position or status within the department.
Kelley answered some of the questions about the rights of civil servants
under The Act. This Note will examine the generalregulations governing civil
servants and municipalitiesin the state of Texas. It will also discuss the impact
of Kelley and the ten years of litigation leading up to the 2010 decision. This
Note will argue that the holding in Kelley is sound and based on fundamental
legal principles including the nondelegation doctrine. This Note, however,
will also argue that the decision in Kelley may produce unintended consequences, including negative policy ramifications in the civil service industry.
Finally, this Note will urge the Texas Legislature to re-evaluate the authority
and jurisdictionof hearing examiners under The Act.
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INTRODUCTION

"Big mistake. Big. Huge," Justice Gray artfully articulated in a recent Texas court of appeals decision) Before 2010, hearing examiners
and courts alike were gravely misinterpreting sections of chapter 143
of the Local Government Code, known as the "Fire Fighter and Police
Officer Civil Service Act" ("The Act").2 The Texas Supreme Court
sought to rectify those misinterpretations in its 2010 decision, City of
Waco v. Kelley ("Kelley II").'
Larry Kelley was a police officer for the city of Waco, Texas. In
2001, while off-duty, he was arrested for Driving While Intoxicated.
The arrest resulted in his indefinite suspension from the Waco Police
Department, which effectively terminated his employment.' Kelley
elected to appeal the indefinite suspension to an independent hearing
examiner, a right granted to civil servants under The Act.' The hearing examiner found in favor of Kelley, reinstating him to the department at the rank of sergeant.8 Several appeals followed this decision,
resulting in ten years of litigation about the rights of the parties to
appeal, and the authority and jurisdiction of independent hearing examiners under The Act.9 In 2010, the Texas Supreme Court held that
hearing examiners are limited to certain parameters when deciding
appeals from disciplinary actions.'o Kelley II held that if a hearing
examiner finds the charges against a civil servant to be true, then he
only has three courses of action." He may (1) uphold an indefinite
suspension from the department; (2) impose a temporary suspension
1. City of Waco v. Kelley, 226 S.W.3d 672, 682 (Tex. App.-Waco 2007) (Gray,
C.J., dissenting), rev'd, 309 S.W.3d 536 (Tex. 2010) (citing PRETrY WOMAN (Touchstone Pictures 1990)).
2. Kelley, 226 S.W.3d at 682.
3. See Kelley, 309 S.W.3d at 541.
4. Id. at 539.
5. Id. at 540.
6. Id.
7. Brief of Amicus Curiae Texas State Association of Fire Fighters at *3, City of
Waco v. Kelley, 309 S.W.3d 536 (Tex. 2010) (No. 07-0485), 2008 WL 2033346.
8. Kelley, 309 S.W.3d at 539.
9. See generally id.; City of Waco v. Kelley, 197 S.W.3d 324, 325 (Tex. 2006) (per
curiam); City of Waco v. Kelley, No. 10-03-00214-CV, 2004 WL 2481383 (Tex. App.Waco Oct. 29, 2004) (mem. op.), rev'd, 197 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. 2006).
10. Kelley, 309 S.W.3d at 546.
11. Id.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol19/iss3/7
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V19.I3.5

2

McCurry: City of Waco v. Kelley: The Ten-Year Saga of teh Rights of Civil

CITY OF WACO V. KELLEY

2013]

787

of fifteen days or less; or (3) completely restore the civil servant's former position or status within the department.12
This Note will thoroughly examine Kelley II and its impact on the
civil service industry. Part II of this Note will introduce the regulations governing civil servants in Texas, providing context for the remainder of the Note. It will briefly discuss collective bargaining
agreements, meet and confer agreements, and The Act. Part III will
discuss the state of the law leading up to the decision in Kelley II. It
will outline the landmark decisions regarding the authority and jurisdiction of hearing examiners in the civil service sector. Finally, it will
examine the split of authority in the Texas courts of appeals, which
ultimately laid the groundwork for the decision in Kelley II. Part IV
will discuss Kelley II and the ten years of litigation that led to the
decision. Finally, Part V will examine the ramifications of Kelley II.
This Note will argue that the holding in Kelley II is sound and based
on fundamental legal principles, including the nondelegation doctrine.
This Note, however, will also argue that the decision in Kelley II may
lead to unintended consequences, including negative policy ramifications moving forward in the civil service industry. As Dr. William McKee, an independent hearing examiner, articulated, "[u]nfortunately,
the Texas Supreme Court's decision has left Hearing Examiners with
very little authority with which to balance the gravity of an offense ...
against mitigating circumstances, no matter how compelling."" Kelley II essentially tied the hands of independent hearing examiners.
This Note will argue that this may potentially cause a ripple effect
across the civil service industry that the legislature did not intend. Finally, this Note will urge the legislature to re-evaluate the authority
and jurisdiction of independent hearing examiners in order to prevent
further unintended consequences.
II.

INTRODUcTION TO THE REGULATIONS OF
THE CIVIL SERVICE SECTOR

Municipal civil servants in Texas are governed by a myriad of policies and regulations.' 4 These regulations, while complex, vary from
municipality to municipality. In the state of Texas, the regulations for
the majority of municipalities come from one of three sources: (1) a
collective bargaining agreement; (2) a meet and confer agreement; or
(3) The Act. Municipalities may choose one form of regulation over
the other for a variety of reasons, which will be discussed further in
the following sections."
12. Id. at 546-47.
13. Kelley v. City of Waco, AAA No. 70 390 00217 10, at 5 (July 28, 2011) (McKee, Arb.) (appeal hearing regarding indefinite suspension).
14. Collective Bargaining or Meet & Confer, TEX. MUN. POLICE ASS'N, http://
www.tmpa.org/TMPAcollectivebargainingvMC.aspx (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).

15. Id.
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Collective Bargaining Agreements

A municipality may elect to govern its civil servants through a collective bargaining agreement, 6 depending on the structure and the
political workings of that municipality." Chapter 174 of the Local
Government Code grants municipalities the authority to enter into a
labor contract, the collective bargaining agreement, with its police officers and fire fighters." Typically, the collective bargaining agreement will prescribe the desired policies for regulating civil service."
Chapter 174 also outlines the process a municipality must go through
to create a collective bargaining agreement. 2 0 First, an association of
civil servants decides that a collective bargaining agreement is the best
way to enforce the policies governing civil servants in its municipality. 2' The association must hold a public referendum on whether to
allow the civil servants to enter into a collective bargaining agreement.2 2 After the public referendum is passed, the association is recognized as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for the members of
the agency. 23 The municipality and the association negotiate the
terms of the labor contract for all civil servants in that agency. 24 The
terms negotiated may supersede any other state law. 25
B.

Meet and Confer Agreements

Another form of regulation for civil servants is the meet and confer
agreement. Meet and confer agreements are similar to collective bargaining agreements. Meet and confer agreements are governed by
chapter 142 of the Local Government Code.26 Municipalities with
populations of at least 50,000 or municipalities that have adopted The
Act are eligible to create meet and confer agreements. 27 No public
referendum is required to give the association the right to create a
meet and confer agreement, but the municipality must agree to it.2
After the municipality agrees to it, the local association then seeks
recognition as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for the civil ser16. TEX. Loc.

GOVT CODE ANN.

§ 174.002(b) (West 2008).

17. TEX. MUN. POucE Ass'N, supra note 14.

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. TEX. Loc. Gov'T

CODE ANN.

§ 174.101-.109 (West 2008); see also TEX.

MUN.

POLICE Ass'N, supra note 14.

21. § 174.102.
22. Id.; see also TEX. MUN. POLICE ASS'N, supra note 14.
23. § 174.102; see also TEX. MUN. POLICE Ass'N, supra note
24. § 174.105; see also TEX. MUN. POLICE ASS'N, supra note
25. § 174.006; see also TEX. MUN. POLICE ASS'N, supra note
26. TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 142.051(a)(1)-(3) (West

14.
14.
14.
2008); see also TEX.

supra note 14.
27. § 142.051(a)(1)-(3).
28. TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 142.055(a)-(e) (West 2008); see also
MUN. POLICE Ass'N, supra note 14.
MUN. POLICE Ass'N,
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vants in the municipality. 29 The municipality officials and the association negotiate the labor employment terms."o The city council and a
majority of the civil servants in the agency must ratify those terms.3 '
If it is ratified, the new contract may supersede any other state law.32
C. The Fire Fighter and Police Officer Civil Service Act
A municipality may choose to adopt The Act if it has a population
of 10,000 or more and has a paid fire or police department. The
legislature passed The Act to "secure efficient fire and police departments composed of capable personnel who are free from political influence and who have permanent employment tenure as public
servants."3 4 The court in Klinger v. City of San Angelo further elaborated on the purpose of The Act: "[t]he overall intent of [The Act] is
to secure efficient, capable, non-politicized fire and police department
personnel by means of a civil service system that establishes promotions based upon demonstrated merit and fitness.""
The Act prescribes guidelines for many areas of civil service regulation, including the promotion, demotion, tenure, and seniority of civil
servants.3 6 It also prescribes the disciplinary procedures for civil servants who are charged with violating a civil service rule. Moreover,
it provides guidelines for civil servants seeking review of disciplinary

actions for violation of a civil service rule." One may violate a civil
service rule if he is convicted of a felony or other crime involving
moral turpitude, violates a municipal charter provision, acts incompetently, drinks intoxicants while on duty, or is intoxicated while off
duty." Under The Act, the department head may impose one of the
following disciplinary actions for a violation of a civil service rule: (1)
suspension of the servant for a "reasonable period not to exceed fifteen calendar days" or (2) suspension of the servant for an "indefinite
period."40 According to section 143.052, an indefinite suspension is
"equivalent to dismissal from the department." 4 1
29. TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 142.058(a) (West 2008); see also TEX. MUN.
POLICE ASS'N, supra note 14.
30. TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 142.060(b) (West 2008); see also TEX. MUN.
POLICE ASS'N, supra note 14.
31. TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 142.064(a) (West 2008); see also TEX. MUN.
POLICE ASS'N, supra note 14.
32. TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 142.067 (West 2008).
33. TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 143.002(a) (West 2008).
34. TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 143.001 (a) (West 2008).
35. Klinger v. City of San Angelo, 902 S.W.2d 669, 676 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995,
writ denied).
36. See generally TEX. Loc, GOVT CODE ANN.
143.021-.038, 143.041-.047,
143.051-.057, 143.0811.090 (West 2008 & Supp. 2012).
37. § 143.057; TEX. Loc. GOVT CODE ANN. § 143.010 (West 2008).
38. §§ 143.057,143.010.
39. § 143.0251.
40. § 143.052(b).
41. Id.
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If a civil servant chooses to appeal his disciplinary action, section
143.057 explains that he must state his appeal of his indefinite suspension, a suspension, a promotional bypass, or a recommended demotion in writing.4 2 He may elect to appeal to the local civil service
commission or to an independent third-party hearing examiner.4 3
If a civil servant chooses to appeal to the local civil service commission, a hearing is held based on the department head's original written
statement of the charges. 44 The commission is given three options
under The Act.45 It can (1) permanently dismiss the servant from the
department; (2) temporarily suspend him from the department; or (3)
restore him to his former position or status in the department's classified service, allowing for back pay and benefits. 46 The commission
can also determine that the disciplinary suspension should be
reduced.4 7
Civil servants are likely to elect to appeal to an independent hearing
examiner.4 8 In Proctorv. Andrews, the court even stated "[i]t is likely
a perception of bias in favor of the City, on the part of the Civil Service Commission, that prompts officers to request that their appeal be
heard under section 143.057."49 The civil service commission members are appointed solely by the municipality's chief executives,50 and
that is a likely reason why an officer would elect to appeal to a hearing
examiner not affiliated with the municipality."
Section 143.057 of The Act describes what happens if an officer
chooses to appeal to an independent hearing examiner.52 The section,
however, does not go into the same detail that is described in section
143.053, which describes the procedures for an appeal to the civil service commission.5 1 Instead, section 143.057 discusses how an independent hearing examiner is chosen, how he is paid, and the rights to
appeal for each party.5 4
42. § 143.057(a).
43. Id.
44. TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 143.053(c) (West 2008).
45. Id. § 143.053(e).
46. Id.
47. Id. § 143.053(f).
48. City of Pasadena v. Smith, 292 S.W.3d 14, 16 (Tex. 2009).
49. Proctor v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729, 736 (Tex. 1998).
50. TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 143.006(b) (West 2008).
51. Smith, 292 S.W.3d at 15 n.8.
52. See TEX. Loc. GOVT CODE ANN. § 143.057 (West 2012).
53. CompareTEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 143.053(e) (West 2008) ("In its decision, the commission shall state whether the suspended fire fighter or police officer is:
(1) permanently dismissed from the fire or police department; (2) temporarily suspended from the department; or (3) restored to the person's former position or status
in the department's classified service."), with § 143.057(f) (stating only that "[i]n each
hearing conducted under this section, the hearing examiner has the same duties and
powers as the commission, including the right to issue subpoenas," but never describing the parameters of hearing examiner's authority.).
54. § 143.057(i).
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Section 143.057(c) states that the decision of the hearing examiner
is binding on all parties, with limited exceptions outlined in subsection
(j).5s Subsection (j) provides the following:
A district court may hear an appeal of a hearing examiner's award
only on the grounds that the arbitration panel was without jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction [sometimes referred to as an abuse
of authority] or that the order was procured by fraud, collusion, or
other unlawful means. An appeal must be brought in the district
court having jurisdiction in the municipality in which the fire or police department is located.
Section 143.057 does not prescribe the parameters of a hearing examiner's award." This omission has led to a large amount of litigation
about the discretion and jurisdiction of a hearing examiner under The
Act." The Texas Supreme Court has ruled on several issues regarding
the legislative omissions in this section. 59
III.

A.

THE LAw PRIOR To KELLEY

The Right to Appeal a Hearing Examiner's Award:
City of Houston v. Clark

In City of Houston v. Clark, a senior fire alarm dispatcher ("Clark")
was suspended for fifteen days without pay.o Clark appealed his suspension to an independent hearing examiner pursuant to section
143.1016(a) of The Act.6 ' The hearing examiner denied Clark's appeal but granted his motion to dismiss. The city of Houston appealed,
arguing that the hearing examiner exceeded his jurisdiction by granting the motion to dismiss. 6 2 Clark argued that the City had no right to
appeal the decision of an independent hearing examiner." The Texas
Supreme Court examined section 143.1016(j) of The Act, which stated
that "a district court may hear an appeal of a hearing examiner's
award." 64 Thus, the right to appeal applies not only to the aggrieved
civil servant, but to the City as well.65 However, the right to appeal is
55. § 14 3.057(c) ("The hearing examiner's decision is final and binding on all parties."); § 143.0570).

56. § 143.053() (When a hearing examiner "exceeds his jurisdiction," it is sometimes referred to as an "abuse of authority.").
57. § 143.057(a)-(j).
58. City of Waco v. Kelley, 309 S.W.3d 536, 542 (Tex. 2010); City of Pasadena v.
Smith, 292 S.W.3d 14, 21 (Tex. 2009); City of Desoto v. White, 288 S.W.3d 389, 392
(Tex. 2009).
59. City of Houston v. Clark, 197 S.W.3d 314, 319 (Tex. 2006); Smith, 292 S.W.3d
at 17.
60. Clark, 197 S.W.3d at 315.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 316.
63. Id. at 317.
64. Id. at 319.
65. Id.
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limited by the scope provided in section 143.1016(j).66 The right to
appeal is dependent on the hearing examiner exceeding his jurisdiction or on whether the decision was procured by fraud, collusion, or
other unlawful means.'67
B.

A Hearing Examiner's Decision Cannot Interfere with the

Nondelegation Doctrine: City of Pasadena v. Smith
In City of Pasadenav. Smith, the Pasadena police chief indefinitely
suspended Smith, a police officer for the city of Pasadena." Smith
appealed to an independent hearing examiner.6 9 At the hearing, the
police chief was not present. 70 Because of his absence, Smith's attorney moved that the suspension be overturned and Smith reinstated.
No evidence was presented at the hearing, and the hearing examiner
granted Smith's motion.7 2 The City appealed the examiner's ruling.
The Texas Supreme Court held that the hearing examiner exceeded
the jurisdiction granted to him under The Act by reversing the officer's indefinite suspension. 74 The hearing examiner granted the
award in favor of the appealing officer because the officer's department head was not at the hearing and no evidence was presented.
The Court held that the hearing examiner's award must be based on
evidence and he exceeded his jurisdiction by rendering a decision not
based on evidence.7 6
The Court in Pasadena was also presented with the issue of the
hearing examiner's decision interfering with the nondelegation doctrine.7 7 The Texas Constitution, under the nondelegation doctrine, restricts what governmental powers may be delegated to private
persons.78 The court discussed that some areas of delegation may be
permissible, referencing Texas Boll Weevil: "[t]he Texas Legislature
may delegate its power to agencies established to carry out legislative
66. Id. at 324.
67. Id.; TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 143.10160) (West 2008).
68. City of Pasadena v. Smith, 292 S.W.3d 14, 15 (Tex. 2009).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 16.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 17.
74. Id. at 21-22.
75. Id. at 16.
76. Id. at 20.
77. Id. at 17.
78. Id. at 17; see Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d
454, 469 (Tex. 1997) ("Still, private delegations clearly raise even more troubling constitutional issues than their public counterparts. On a practical basis, the private delegate may have a personal or pecuniary interest which is inconsistent with or
repugnant to the public interest to be served. More fundamentally, the basic concept
of democratic rule under a republican form of government is compromised when public powers are abandoned to those who are neither elected by the people, appointed
by a public official or entity, nor employed by the government.").
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purposes, as long as it establishes reasonable standards to guide the
entity to which the powers are delegated." 9 The court stated the
following:
A delegation of power without such standards is an abdication of
the authority to set government policy which the Constitution assigns to the legislative department. While legislative delegations of
authority to other governmental entities can raise constitutional
concerns, private delegations clearly raise even more troubling constitutional issues than their public counterparts.8 0
The Court in Pasadena held that in order to avoid violating the
nondelegation doctrine, the private independent hearing examiners
must be subject to meaningful review:
But if the Act does not bind hearing examiners to definite standards
for reaching decisions and instead gives them broad latitude in determining not only factual disputes by the applicable law, they become not merely independent arbiters but policy makers, which is a
legislative function. This would raise nondelegation concerns. 8 1
The Court stated that a city must be afforded a right to judicial review
under certain circumstances in order to alleviate nondelegation doctrine concerns.82 The Court held that the hearing examiner exceeded
his jurisdiction, stating "the most accurate test we can state is that a
hearing examiner exceeds his jurisdiction when his acts are not authorized by The Act or are contrary to it, or when they invade the
policy-setting realm protected by the nondelegation doctrine."

C.

The Split in Texas Courts of Appeals

Before Kelley, there was a spilt in the Texas courts of appeals regarding the authority and jurisdiction of independent hearing examiners." As this Note has discussed, the Texas Supreme Court decisions
in Clark and Pasadenaprovided some guidance on the authority of an
independent hearing examiner.
Clark and Pasadena,however, did not settle all of the problems. 6
There was still a split between the courts of appeals about what ex79. Smith, 292 S.W.3d at 17.
80. Id. at 18; Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 469.
81. Smith, 292 S.W.3d. at 18-19.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 21.
84. Brief of Amicus Curiae Texas State Association of Fire Fighters, supra note 7,
at *10--11; see generally Nuchia v. Tippy, 973 S.W.2d 782, 786 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1998,
no pet.); City of Laredo v. Leal, 161 S.W.3d 558, 562-63 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2004, pet. denied); Lindsey v. Fireman's & Policeman's Civil Serv. Comm'n of Houston, 980 S.W.2d 233, 236 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).
85. See City of Houston v. Clark, 197 S.W.3d 314, 319 (Tex. 2006); Smith, 292
S.W.3d at 21.
86. Brief of Amicus Curiae Texas State Association of Fire Fighters, supra note 7,
at *10-11.
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actly constituted an abuse of authority or jurisdiction, allowing for an
appeal to the district court.
Some courts, like the Tyler, San
Antonio, and Waco courts of appeals, viewed a hearing examiner's
decision that misinterprets, ignores, or incorrectly applies the law to
be an abuse of authority, thus giving the parties the right of appeal,
and giving the district court the right of review.88 Other courts, such
as the Houston court of appeals, were less willing to label an independent hearing examiner's award that is inconsistent with statutory law
an abuse of authority.89 It was much more likely to consider the
award a mistake of law, thus not allowing the parties the right of appeal and the district court the jurisdiction to hear any such appeal. 90
For example, the court of appeals in Tyler held that a hearing examiner's misapplication of section 143.123(e) allowed for judicial review. 9 ' In Nuchia v. Tippy, an independent hearing examiner
overturned the indefinite suspension of a Houston police officer. 2 He
found that the city of Houston violated section 143.123(e) when it allowed the complainant to also investigate the allegations against the
officer.9 3 The City appealed, arguing that the hearing examiner
lacked jurisdiction to determine whether the officer's rights were violated during the investigation.9 4 The court of appeals in Tyler held
that the hearing examiner did have the authority to determine
whether a violation of section 143.123(e) had occurred, stating
"[c]ertainly the [liegislature did not create a remedy without providing
a means of effecting that remedy." 95 The court held that the hearing
examiner did not abuse his authority by reinstating the officer.96
The court of appeals in San Antonio held that a hearing examiner's
reduction of an indefinite suspension to a 644-day suspension was not
an abuse of authority. In City of Laredo v. Leal, a Laredo police
officer appealed his indefinite suspension to a hearing examiner.98
The hearing examiner reduced the indefinite suspension to a 644-day
suspension without pay.99 The officer appealed the hearing examiner's award.'" He argued that the local collective bargaining agree87. Id.; see generally Nuchia, 973 S.W.2d at 786; Leal, 161 S.W.3d at 562-63.
88. Nuchia, 973 S.W.2d at 786; Leal, 161 S.W.3d at 562-63; Brief of Amicus Curiae
Texas State Association of Fire Fighters, supra note 7, at *10-11.
89. Lindsey, 980 S.W.2d at 236.
90. Id.
91. Nuchia, 973 S.W.2d at 784.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 786.
96. Id.
97. City of Laredo v. Leal, 161 S.W.3d 558, 562 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004,
pet. denied).
98. Id. at 561.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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ment and section 143.052(b) only allowed for a thirty-day
suspension.i 0 ' The court of appeals rejected the officer's appeal, holding that the hearing examiner did not abuse his authority or exceed his
jurisdiction.o 2 The court reasoned that the statute only limited the
authority of the police chief to impose discipline.' The statute, however, did not restrict the authority of the local civil service commission
or hearing examiner.' 0 4 The court held that section 143.053(f) permitted the hearing examiner to reduce the period of suspension imposed
by the department head, and because there was no express statutory
provision limiting that power, the hearing examiner did not exceed his
jurisdiction by reducing the indefinite suspension to 644 days.' 05 This
decision is later contradicted by the decision in Kelley II.
Both the courts in San Antonio and Tyler adhere to the view that
the court has the jurisdiction to hear an appeal of an award given by
an independent hearing examiner that may have misapplied the law in
a way that exceeded his jurisdiction granted under The Act. 0 6 It appears that the court of appeals in Houston views a hearing examiner's
misapplication of statutory law in a different way. 0 7
In Lindsey v. Fireman's & Policeman's Civil Service Commission of
the City of Houston, a police officer was investigated for a civil service
violation.' The city of Houston had 180 days under The Act to take
disciplinary action."0" The City notified the officer of his pending suspension within the permitted time frame, but the suspension did not
actually begin until over 180 days after the City learned of the offense." 0 The officer appealed his suspension to an independent hearing examiner, stating that it could not stand because it was not
imposed within 180 days of the alleged offense as required by section
143.117(d)."1' The hearing examiner ruled that the suspension was
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id. at 562.
Id. at 563.
Id.
Id. at 563-64.
Id. at 562-63 ("Accordingly, 'a district court may hear an appeal of a hearing

examiner's award only on the grounds that . . . the hearing examiner was without

jurisdiction . . . . This 'standard has been interpreted as an 'abuse of authority standard'. . . . 'An abuse of authority occurs when a decision is so arbitrary and unreasonable that it amounts to a clear and prejudicial error of law."'); Nuchia v. Tippy, 973
S.W.2d 782, 786 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1998, no pet.) ("The ultimate issue before the trial
court was whether, as a matter of law, the examiner was empowered to make the
determination he made. The City, in its motions and responses, failed to controvert
Tippy's position that the hearing examiner did, in fact, have the jurisdiction to determine if a violation of § 143.123(e) had occurred.").
107. Lindsey v. Fireman's & Policeman's Civil Serv. Comm'n of Houston, 980
S.W.2d 233, 236 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).
108. Id. at 234.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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timely and upheld it." 2 The officer appealed, arguing that the hearing
examiner exceeded his jurisdiction by first interpreting section
143.117(d) and then misinterpreting the statute."' The court of appeals discussed the hearing examiner's misinterpretation of the statute, stating that "[t]his authority includes applying, interpreting, and
enforcing rules adopted by the commission and the procedural rules
the legislature has adopted to govern suspensions. The appellate
courts should not disturb this authority without a clear showing of an
abuse of authority."1 1 4 The court of appeals held that there were not
sufficient grounds for appeal because the hearing examiner had the
authority to apply section 143.117, and the hearing examiner's alleged
misapplication of the statute did not qualify as exceeding his jurisdiction or an abuse of authority." The court stated that a different conclusion would "stymie and completely hobble civil service
commissions and independent hearing examiners hearing appeals of
suspensions and other disciplinary actions." 1 6
The disagreement about what constitutes a hearing examiner exceeding his jurisdiction or abusing his authority is evident among the
courts of appeals. This split laid the groundwork for the decision in
Kelley II, and thus it led to the reason why the Texas Supreme Court
heard Kelley on two separate issues and on two separate occasions.
IV. A

HEARING EXAMINER'S JURISDICTION, A TEN-YEAR SAGA:
CITY OF WACO v. KELLEY

The city of Waco is a "civil service statute city," meaning that it has
adopted the civil service rules outlined in The Act, and it does not
have a meet and confer agreement or a collective bargaining agreement."' Larry Kelley started working for the Waco Police Department, in Waco, Texas, in the 1970s."' In 1999, he was appointed to
assistant chief of police, a position that is directly below the head of
the department." 9 In 2001, Kelley was off-duty at a convention in
Austin,Texas.120 While in Austin, he was arrested and charged with a
Class B misdemeanor of Driving While Intoxicated ("DWI"). 2 ' After his arrest, Kelley immediately contacted his superior, the chief of
police.12 2 An investigation ensued, and Kelley soon faced disciplinary
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 237.
Id. at 236-37.
City of Waco v. Kelley, 309 S.W.3d 536, 539 (Tex. 2010).

118. Id.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 539-40.
Id. at 540.
Id.
See id.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol19/iss3/7
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V19.I3.5

12

McCurry: City of Waco v. Kelley: The Ten-Year Saga of teh Rights of Civil

CITY OF WACO V. KELLEY

2013]

797

procedures.12 3 Specifically, the chief found that Kelley violated a civil
service rule by being arrested for a DWI, and the chief indefinitely
suspended him from the police force. 124 Under section 143.052(b) of
The Act, an indefinite suspension is essentially equivalent to a termination.2 5 The Act allows for an officer to appeal his disciplinary action-either to the civil service commission or to an independent
hearing examiner.126 Kelley chose to appeal his indefinite suspension
to an independent hearing examiner. 1 2 7 The parties selected an independent hearing examiner, and a hearing was held in November 2001
and March 2002.128 In June 2002, the hearing examiner issued a writ-

ten decision.129
The hearing examiner determined that the charges against Kelley
were true but his punishment was excessive.' 3 0 The hearing examiner's award reduced Kelley's suspension from indefinite to 180
days."' The examiner also ordered that Kelley be reinstated in the
Waco Police Department, in the rank of sergeant, effectively demoting
him two ranks from assistant chief.'3 2 He also awarded Kelley back
pay and benefits, stating that he be "made whole subject to the normal
principles of mitigation.""'
The city of Waco appealed the hearing examiner's award to the district court, stating that the hearing examiner exceeded his jurisdiction
by reducing the length of the suspension, awarding back pay and benefits, and demoting Kelley.' 3 4 Kelley moved to dismiss the City's appeal, arguing that the City did not have the right to appeal the hearing
examiner's decision and that the district court lacked jurisdiction. 5
Kelley also filed a motion for summary judgment, stating that the
hearing examiner did not exceed his jurisdiction by reducing his suspension."'

The district court denied the motion to dismiss but

granted his motion for summary judgment."' The City appealed to
the court of appeals in Waco, where the case was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. 3
123. See id.
124. Id. at 540.
125. Id.; TEx. Loc. GOv'T CODE ANN. § 143.052(b) (West 2012).
126. Kelley, 309 S.W.3d at 539.
127. Id. at 540.
128. Id.
129. City of Waco v. Kelley, 226 S.W.3d 672, 674 (Tex. App.-Waco 2007), rev'd,
309 S.W.3d 536 (Tex. 2010).
130. Kelley, 309 S.W.3d at 539.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 540.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. City of Waco v. Kelley, No. 10-03-00214-CV, 2004 WL 2481383 (Tex. App.Waco Oct. 29, 2004) (mem. op.), rev'd, 197 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. 2006).
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Kelley I

The City appealed to the Supreme Court of Texas.' 3 9 In the time
between the City's appeal to the court of appeals and its appeal to the
Texas Supreme Court, the Texas Supreme Court decided City of
Houston v. Clark.'4 0 In Clark, the Court held that municipalities have
the ability to appeal adverse decisions of independent hearing examiners under The Act.14 ' Following Clark, the Court held that the city
could appeal adverse decisions and the district court did have proper
jurisdiction to hear the appeal, reversing and remanding the case. 14 2
On remand, the court of appeals in Waco held that the hearing examiner did not exceed his jurisdiction when he reduced the length of
Kelley's suspension but exceeded his jurisdiction by demoting Kelley
to the rank of sergeant. 14 3 It stated that "apart from this unique situation [referring to when a hearing examiner finds charges to be untrue],
an independent hearing examiner has the authority and jurisdiction to
reduce the length of an indefinite suspension, even if the charges are
found to be true."' 4 4 The court also determined that because a local
civil service commission lacked the ability to demote an officer's rank,
then an independent hearing examiner did not have the authority to

demote him either. 14 5
Justice Gray wrote a heated and facetious dissenting opinion.14 6 He
quoted the motion picture, Pretty Woman, stating that the majority
made a "Big mistake. Big. Huge."I 47 Justice Gray argued that a strict
reading of section 143.014(h) reveals that a "person in Kelley's position has the same rights and privileges of a hearing before a [hearing
examiner] in the same manner and under the same conditions as a
classified employee."1 4 8 He stated that the hearing examiner clearly
exceeded his authority by giving Kelley a 180-day suspension, a punishment that is not prescribed in The Act.14 9 He also stated that The
Act never gave a hearing examiner any kind of discretion to demote
an officer, so Kelley's demotion exceeded the hearing examiner's auJustice Gray stated that the court has no way of
thority as well.'
knowing what a hearing examiner would determine had he known the
proper parameters of his award; thus it was completely arbitrary for
139. City of Waco v. Kelley, 197 S.W.3d 324, 325 (Tex. 2006).
140. Id.; see City of Houston v. Clark, 197 S.W.3d 314, 319 (Tex. 2006).
141. Clark, 197 S.W.3d at 324.
142. See id.
143. City of Waco v. Kelley, 226 S.W.3d 672, 681 (Tex. App.-Waco 2007), rev'd,
309 S.W.3d 536 (Tex. 2010).
144. Id. at 679.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 682.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 681.

149. Id. at 685.
150. Id. at 684.
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the majority to reinstate Kelley as assistant chief without a rehearing.15 '
B.

Kelley II

The city of Waco appealed to the Texas Supreme Court again on
several issues.'
It argued that when a hearing examiner finds that
the charges against an indefinitely suspended officer are true, The Act
only gives the hearing examiner the authority to uphold the suspension."' The City also contended that even if the hearing examiner
had the jurisdiction to reinstate the officer, he had no authority to
reduce the officer's suspension to 180 days. 1 54
The Court first discussed the parameters of the jurisdiction of an
independent hearing examiner.' 55 It held that the hearing examiner is
not authorized to make rules and must follow the rules prescribed by
The Act." 6 The Court quoted City of Pasadenav. Smith: "[t]he most
accurate test we can state is that a hearing examiner exceeds his jurisdiction when his acts are not authorized by The Act or are contrary to
it, or when they invade the policy-setting realm protected by the
nondelegation doctrine.""'7 The Court in Kelley II was faced with deciding whether the hearing examiner exceeded his jurisdiction by
awarding relief not authorized or contrary to what was allowed by The
Act.1 58
The City argued that section 143.014(h) did not give the hearing
examiner the authority to reduce Kelley's suspension, or demote him
when the charges against him were found to be true.'5 9 Kelley argued
that the city is prohibited from making that argument because the
chief, in his written suspension of Kelley, did not cite section
143.014(h) as a basis for discipline, as prescribed under section
143.052(e).'
Kelley also argued that the legislature could not have
intended to give a hearing examiner no authority to alter the disciplinary action, even if he found the allegations to be true. 6
The Court examined the authority granted by The Act when the
hearing examiner finds the charges to be true. 1 6 2 Since section
143.057 did not specifically state the parameters of the hearing examiner's discretion, the Court looked to the intent of the legislature to
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id at 685.
City of Waco v. Kelley, 309 S.W.3d 536, 541 (Tex. 2010).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 542.
Id.
Id.; see City of Pasadena v. Smith, 292 S.W.3d 14, 21 (Tex. 2009).
Kelley, 309 S.W.3d at 542.
Id. at 543.
Id. at 544.
Id.
Id. at 544-48.
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determine what specific relief The Act authorized."'3 Since neither
section 143.014(h) nor section 143.057 addressed the authority of a
hearing examiner when he finds the charges to be true, the Court examined what a department head could do when making a decision on
disciplinary action, because it was the only specifically prescribed
route of punishment described in The Act.16 4
Looking at The Act, the Court determined that a department head
could impose either voluntary discipline or involuntary discipline.16 5
Voluntary discipline is when the officer agrees to the discipline.' 6 It
can include demotion, suspension for a period of sixteen to ninety
days, or uncompensated duty."' The department head imposes involuntary discipline, however, whether or not the officer accepts it.168
Section 143.052(b) describes involuntary discipline to include suspension for a "reasonable period not to exceed fifteen calendar days or
for an indefinite period."' 6 9 Involuntary discipline is only an option if
the officer violated a civil service rule.' Essentially, if a department
head feels that a violation warrants involuntary discipline, he has only
two choices: (1) indefinitely suspend the officer; or (2) temporarily
suspend him, without pay, for fifteen days or less.' 7 1
The Court stated the following:
We see no language indicating the [l]egislature intended to allow an
independent third party hearing examiner to impose a longer temporary disciplinary suspension than the department head could impose. And we do not believe construing the statute to grant such
authority would yield the reasonable result the [liegislature is presumed to intend.' 7 2
If an officer chooses to appeal his involuntary discipline, the hearing
examiner can only suspend the officer if he finds that (1) the charges
against the officer are true and (2) he violated a civil service rule.' 7 3

The hearing examiner, however, does not have to uphold the suspension of the officer.174 The Court held that The Act clearly laid out that
he may uphold the officer's indefinite suspension or restore him to his
former classified position with back pay and benefits. 7 7 The Court
held that the hearing examiner also has a third option-to impose a
163. Id. at 542.
164. Id. at 543.
165. Id. at 545.

166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.; see TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE
Kelley, 309 S.W.3d at 546.
Id.
Id.; see TEX. Loc. GOVT CODE
Kelley, 309 S.W.3d at 546.
Id.

ANN.

§ 143.052(b) (West 2008).

ANN.

§ 143.053(g) (West 2008).
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temporary suspension."7 The length of the temporary suspension
that the hearing examiner may impose is not clearly prescribed by The
Act.' 7 The Court stated, "we see no language indicating that the legislature intended to allow an independent third party hearing examiner to impose a longer temporary disciplinary suspension than the
department head could impose." 7 Thus, the hearing examiner, if he
found the charges to be true and wanted to impose a temporary suspension, could only impose the same fifteen days or less that the department head could have originally imposed.1 79
If a hearing examiner finds the charges of violating a civil service
rule against an officer are true, then he only has three courses of action.so He may (1) uphold an indefinite suspension from the department; (2) impose a temporary suspension of fifteen days or less; or (3)
completely restore the officer's former position or status within the
department.18 ' The Court cited City of Pasedena,stating that if a statute does not give definite standards for decision-making, hearing examiners may become more than independent arbitrators, but policy
makers.18 2 The Court also discussed how allowing hearing examiners
unlimited discretion would have an impractical effect:
It takes little imagination to envision how suspending officers for
lengthy and unpredictable time periods could disrupt operations
and schedules of police departments; not to mention the difficulties
that allowing unfettered leeway to third party hearing examiners
pose to department discipline and morale. Moreover, interpreting
Section 143.053(e)(2) to allow suspensions without any time limits
invites challenge of the Act as an improper delegation of legislative
authority. 83
The Court held that the hearing examiner exceeded his jurisdiction by
acting contrary to The Act when he prescribed disciplinary actions not
outlined in it.'" The Court reversed and remanded the case for a new
hearing under the new parameters for hearing examiner discretion.s85
C. Kelley's 2011 Re-hearing
The parties met again before an independent hearing examiner in
June of 2011, ten years after Kelley's arrest.' 8 6 At the hearing, the
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 546-47.
182. Id. at 546.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 552.
185. Id.
186. Kelley v. City of Waco, AAA No. 70 390 00217 10, at 1 (July 28, 2011) (McKee, Arb.) (appeal hearing regarding indefinite suspension).
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parties stipulated that Kelley was guilty of the offense of DWI.'" The
only contested issue at the hearing was whether the Waco chief of
police had just cause to impose the indefinite suspension of Kelley,
despite his twenty-two years of virtually spotless service to the city of
Waco.' The hearing examiner, with limited options under the new
guidelines, upheld the indefinite suspension of Kelley:
Unfortunately, the Texas Supreme Court's decision has left Hearing
Examiners with very little authority with which to balance the gravity of an offense such as the one proven here against mitigating circumstances, no matter how compelling. The result of the Court's
ruling, it seems, is likely to be awards that are extreme in one direction or another. 89
The hearing examiner went on to state as follows:
The City had sufficient cause for the indefinite suspension, but it
could have done much better for an employee who, in all other but
this situation, had served it well. As such, I strongly encourage, but
cannot compel, the City to find a way to re-hire Kelley in some
capacity.' *
Kelley ultimately chose not to pursue an appeal of the hearing examiner's latest decision, stating that he had "fought the good fight."191
V.

THE AFTERMATH OF KELLEY

I

Courts have generally supported the Kelley II decision. Several
subsequent decisions tracked the reasoning in Kelley II.192 The court
in Miller discussed Kelley II in length and adopted its reasoning, stating that "[t]he hearing examiner in this case was authorized to reduce
Miller's indefinite suspension to a temporary suspension, but he was
not authorized to impose a temporary suspension of more than fifteen
days.""' In Mathews, the court also examined the decision in Kelley
II, stating that "[al hearing examiner must follow the law set by the
[legislature" and holding that a hearing examiner who ruled contrary
to The Act exceeded his jurisdiction.'
Proponents of the decision in Kelley II might argue that a hearing
examiner's authority must be judicially limited to the confines de187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 2-3.

Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.

191. Tommy Witherspoon, Ex-Waco Assistant Police Chief Ends Legal Fight with
City, WACO TRIB.-HERALD, Aug. 9, 2011, http://www.wacotrib.cominews/Ex-Waco-

assistant-police-chief-ends-legal-fight-with-city.html.
192. See generally Miller v. City of Houston, 309 S.W.3d 681, 685-86 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.); City of Beaumont v. Mathews, No. 09-10-00198CV, 2011 WL 3847338, at *2 (Tex. App.-Beaumont Aug. 31, 2011, no pet. h.) (mem.
op.).
193. Miller, 309 S.W.3d at 686.
194. Mathews, 2011 WL 3847338, at *2.
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scribed in Kelley II in order to avoid violating the nondelegation doctrine.'15 As discussed in Pasadena and Kelley 11, the Texas
Constitution places strict guidelines on the delegation of government
power to private persons."' The Court in Kelley II clearly kept the
nondelegation doctrine in mind when it stated that "interpreting
[slection 143.053(e)(2) to allow suspension without any time limits invites challenges of [T]he Act as an improper delegation of legislative
authority.""'
Allowing a hearing examiner to have an unrestricted license to fashion his version of justice is likely not desired by either party. 98 There
is added scrutiny, as there should be, when the hearing examiner is
interpreting and applying statutes that have been passed by elected
political representatives.' 99 Some scholars agree that judicial intervention is sometimes necessary: "[j]udicial intervention in these cases
should be limited to situations in which the arbitrator clearly has misapplied a legislative dictate that influenced the award."2 0 0 In light of
the nondelegation doctrine and the judicial acceptance of the decision
in Kelley II, it was most likely decided correctly.
While the courts seem to adhere to Kelley II's reasoning, there
seems to be some backlash among independent hearing examiners. 20 1
The hearing examiner, Dr. William McKee, in Kelley's 2011 re-hearing candidly discussed his new judicial restraints:
Unfortunately, the Texas Supreme Court's decision has left Hearing
Examiners with very little authority with which to balance the gravity of an offense such as the one proven here against mitigating circumstances, no matter how compelling. The result of the Court's
ruling, it seems, is likely to be awards that are extreme in one direction or another . . .. As such, I strongly encourage, but cannot

compel, the City to find a way to re-hire Kelley in some capacity
and for the requisite months that would allow him to satisfy the
period-of-service requirement for a full pension. 202
This statement from Dr. McKee leads to the conclusion that he might
have reinstated Kelley in some capacity had he been given the authority to do so.
195. City of Waco v. Kelley, 309 S.W.3d 536, 541-42 (Tex. 2010).
196. Id. at 546; City of Pasadena v. Smith, 292 S.W.3d 14, 17-18 (Tex. 2009).
197. Kelley, 309 S.W.3d at 546.
198. Corrected Brief of Amicus Curiae City of Houston at *8, City of Waco v. Kelley, 309 S.W.3d 536 (Tex. 2010) (No. 07-0485), 2008 WL 2977732.
199. Charles B. Craver, The Judicial Enforcement of Public Sector Grievance Arbitration, 58 TEx. L. REv. 329, 349 (1980).
200. Id.
201. City of Beaumont v. Mathews, No. 09-10-00198-CV, 2011 WL 3847338, at *2
(Tex. App.-Beaumont Aug. 31, 2011, no pet. h.) (mem. op.); see generally Miller v.
City of Houston, 309 S.W.3d 681, 685-86 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no
pet.).
202. Kelley v. City of Waco, AAA No. 70 390 00217 10, at 5-6 (July 28, 2011)
(McKee, Arb.) (appeal hearing regarding indefinite suspension).
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Good Decision, Poor Policy?

The decision in Kelley II was timely and needed because of the disagreement among the Texas courts of appeals regarding the jurisdiction
of a hearing examiner under The Act.2 03 The courts of appeals were
not applying a consistent standard for hearing examiner discretion,
leading to unpredictable results in the civil service industry. Furthermore, this Note does not argue that the Texas Supreme Court made
the wrong decision in Kelley H1. The decision was very likely sound,
based squarely on The Act and the issues before the Court. It is important to note, however, that the Court in Kelley II only looked to
what sanctions the chief could give a civil servant who violated a civil
service rule because it was the only specifically prescribed route of
punishment described in The Act, not because that was what the legislature truly intended or believed would be the most just.2 04 The Court
presumed that the legislature outlined reasonable guidelines for
chiefs, and those guidelines would logically apply to independent
hearing examiners. The Court did the best it could in a situation
where there was a clear omission in The Act, and the lower courts
were demanding clarification.
While Kelley II fairly clarified the jurisdiction and authority of hearing examiners under The Act, it is likely that the Court's decision does
not comport with an individual civil servant's ideas of fairness and
justice. Fairness and justice are at the forefront of the civil service
industry: "[t]he issues of fairness and justice are always a concern in
any proceeding, including proceedings conducted by IHEs [independent hearing examiners]."2 0 5 This leads to a troubling predicament.
After Kelley II, more hearing examiners may find themselves in situations where they are conflicted between staying within the confines of
their newly judicially-determined authority and rendering decisions
that they find are truly equitable in light of the circumstances. It is
obvious Dr. McKee did not feel that the new judicial constraints on
the authority of a hearing examiner were in the interest of fairness
and justice, at least, not as applied to Larry Kelley.2 06
Surely, the legislature did not intend to place hearing examiners and
civil servants in such a precarious situation. The legislature has long
recognized the sensitive nature of the civil service industry. The governing of civil servants in Texas is a particularized area, one that required legislative action. Local governments are highly political
bodies. Civil servants are often unionized, thus leading to further political polarization. 207 The legislature, recognizing this, passed The
203.
at *6.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Brief of Amicus Curiae Texas State Association of Fire Fighters, supra note 7,
City of Waco v. Kelley, 309 S.W.3d 536, 542-43 (Tex. 2010).
Corrected Brief of Amicus Curiae City of Houston, supra note 198, at *8.
See Kelley, AAA No. 70 390 00217 10, at 5-6.
TEX. MUN. POLICE Ass'N, supra note 14.
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Act to help alleviate some of the political polarization. 20 8 The legislature passed The Act for the express purpose of "secur[ing] efficient
fire and police departments composed of capable personnel who are
free from political influence and who have permanent employment
tenure as public servants." 20 9 To further this goal, The Act provided
administrative procedures and guidelines by which civil servants could
seek review of disciplinary actions.21 0 The legislature explicitly provided that an officer may elect to appeal to an independent hearing
examiner instead of to the city's appointed civil service commission, 2 1'
thus emphasizing the importance of a fair and impartial review of disciplinary actions. Kelley II stripped independent hearing examiners of
a level of discretion, causing civil servants to feel that they are deprived of a valuable right under The Act:
Clearly, this purpose is best served by interpreting the CSA [civil
service act] in a way that enables cities to secure the most capable
personnel possible, including appointed department heads. . . . The
commission or hearing examiner deciding a discharge appeal loses
all authority to reinstate the officer if charges are found to be true,
no matter how disproportionate the penalty of discharge might
be. 2 12
Given the steps the legislature took to ensure that the civil service
industry is governed fairly, it seems unlikely that it intended for civil
servants to be placed in such difficult situations.
There is also a larger policy issue at play here. The use of binding
arbitration has been highly effective for settling disputes in the public
sector, usually with both parties accepting the arbitrator's award. 1
Lessened finality in civil service disputes could lead to major ramifications. When judicial intervention into binding arbitral awards is too
readily available, disgruntled parties may invoke it too often, thus interfering with the arbitrator's authority and frustrating the purpose of
the party who sought binding arbitration to begin with. 214 This is not
to say no judicial intervention is needed; almost all jurisdictions provide for a limited right to judicial review of binding arbitration, 1 as
there needs to be a way to right egregious arbitrator wrongs.21 6 There
is general acceptance, however, that the judiciary should not intervene
208. TEX. Loc. Gov'r CODE ANN. § 143.001(a) (West 2011).
209. Id.
210. See generally TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. H§ 143.010, 143.057 (West 2011).
211. See generally § 143.057; TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 143.053 (West 2008).
212. Brief of-Amicus Curiae Texas State Association of Fire Fighters, supra note 7,
at *35-37.
213. Craver, supra note 199, at 330.
214. Id. at 349.
215. Louis S. Cataland, Note, Binding Arbitrationand the Nondelegation Doctrine:
Does Ohio's Collective BargainingAct Unconstitutionally Delegate Legislative Authority to Administratively Appointed Arbitrators?,6 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 83, 96

(1990).
216. Craver, supra note 199, at 349.
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when an arbitrator is simply misconstruing legal principles.2 1" There
must be a balance between judicial intervention and the authority of
independent hearing examiners. The decisions in Pasadenaand Kelley II made the final and binding award of the hearing examiner not
quite as "binding" and certainly not as "final." This will likely cause
valued and respected civil servants to be less willing to step up and
serve in civil service positions because they know their rights have
been substantially affected.2 1 8
B.

Kelley II: A Costly Decision

Not only will extreme judicial intervention in binding awards cause
society to suffer from the loss of qualified and reliable civil servants, it
will create harsh economic consequences as well. Professor Michael
H. LeRoy conducted a study regarding the finality of employment disputes governed by the Federal Arbitration Act. 1 It showed that
there is a decline in the number of courts that are upholding arbitrator's decisions, reflecting that there is a "measurable degree of judicial
hostility to arbitration in state courts."22 0 He found that this led to a
drastic increase of expense to parties.2 2 1
His theory holds true in the situation with Kelley II. The city of
Waco spent over $250,000 pursing multiple appeals in the ten-year
saga.22 2 It is likely that the citizens of Waco did not expect the indefinite suspension of an assistant chief of police to cost their city
$250,000 in tax dollars and ten years worth of time and energy to ensure he remained terminated.
VI.

CONcLusioN

It would be impossible for the legislature to anticipate every potential problem The Act might create. The court in Proctor v. Andrews
even stated,
Requiring the legislature to include every detail would defeat the
purpose of delegating legislative authority. While the [l]egislature
must declare the policy and fix the primary standard, the policy and
standards declared may be broad or general, so long as the idea
217. Id.
218. Brief of Amicus Curiae Texas State Association of Fire Fighters, supra note 7,
at *37 ("Given the political nature of jobs at the assistant department head level, it is
easy to understand why even very good employees would be unwilling to risk appointment to a position stripped of all civil service protections.").
219. Michael H. LeRoy, Misguided Fairness? Regulating Arbitration by Statute:
Empirical Evidence of Declining Award Finality, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 551, 556

(2008).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Witherspoon, supra note 191.
223. See id.
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embodied is reasonably clear and the standards are capable of reasonable application.2 2
The legislature cannot enact a perfect statute, free from unforeseen
complications. The legislature, however, can remedy imperfections in
its statutes once they have been brought to light. Kelley II shed light
on areas of The Act that need some clarification from the legislature.
It is evident from the jurisprudence leading up to Kelley II, and the
fallout in its wake, that the legislature should step in and re-examine
the authority and jurisdiction of independent hearing examiners under
The Act.
Kelley II, although a sound decision, has cast a light on an area of
The Act that needs remedying. Kelley II severely limited the discretion of hearing examiners and their ability to balance the circumstances of a disciplinary appeal based on fairness and justice.
Independent hearing examiners play a vital role in the regulation of
municipalities and the civil servants who serve those municipalities.
Tying the hands of hearing examiners will only deter civil servants
from desiring to take on positions that require added responsibility,
out of fear that they will not be fairly protected if their actions are
ever questioned. Kelley II created instability and unpredictability in
an environment that thrives on the stable and fair application of strict
rules and guidelines. The effect of Kelley II on the civil service industry will hopefully inspire the legislature to re-evaluate the authority
and jurisdiction of hearing examiners under The Act. The Act was
passed to ensure that civil servants are protected from the political
underworkings that are prevalent in so many municipalities; perhaps it
is time that the legislature re-examine some of the provisions of The
Act and their judicial interpretations to make sure those policy interests remain protected.
224. Proctor v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729, 737-38 (Tex. 1998) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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